Sanctions of the European Union as an instrument for the protection of human rights: Current state, challenges and prospects for legal regulation

Vasyl Sendziuk
Abstract

This article examines the sanctions policy of the European Union as an instrument for the protection of human rights, with a particular focus on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime of 2020. The aim of the study was to outline the current state of the legal framework, identify the challenges associated with its implementation, and propose directions for its further development. A systematic approach was employed, combining formal legal, comparative legal and historical legal methods. The article considered the development of the global sanctions regime as a “horizontal” (thematic) instrument that enables targeted responses to serious human rights violations regardless of jurisdiction, through a combination of travel bans, asset freezes and prohibitions on making funds available. Practical application has demonstrated its suitability for supporting international human rights standards and facilitating coordination with international partners; however, it has also revealed inconsistencies and selectivity in listings, largely dependent upon the requirement for unanimity within the Council of the European Union. Several procedural risks have been identified, including limited transparency regarding the reasoning behind listings, difficulties faced by sanctioned individuals in accessing evidential material, and inconsistencies in national implementation, particularly concerning visa restrictions and the identification and freezing of assets. The absence of corruption as an independent ground for sanctions narrows the scope of the regime in comparison with its counterparts in the United States and the United Kingdom, thereby limiting its effectiveness against networks in which human rights abuses are intertwined with kleptocratic practices. Cross-regime coordination of sanctions lists has increased, yet remains incomplete, creating opportunities for circumvention. The practical significance of this research lies in the potential use of its findings to broaden the substantive criteria that may justify the imposition of sanctions, enhance transparency and the frequency of list reviews while safeguarding the right to defence, institutionalise monitoring of sanctions implementation at EU level, and strengthen international coordination

Keywords

restrictive measures; targeted sanctions; EU global sanctions regime; international sanctions law; EU foreign policy

Suggested citation
Sendziuk, V. (2026). Sanctions of the European Union as an instrument for the protection of human rights: Current state, challenges and prospects for legal regulation. Law. Human. Environment, 17(2), 179-199. https://doi.org/10.31548/law/2.2026.179
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